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A B S T R A C T   
The newly emerging concept of sustainable welfare refers to welfare systems which aim to satisfy everyone's 
needs within planetary boundaries and to decouple the welfare-growth nexus. Both Universal Basic Income (UBI) 
and Universal Basic Services (UBS) have been discussed as suitable, but potentially competing, approaches that 
could support sustainable welfare. This paper contributes to this debate by asking how UBI and UBS compare in 
relation to four sustainable welfare criteria: a) planetary boundaries, b) needs satisfaction, c) fair distribution, 
and d) democratic governance. The paper argues that UBI and UBS are not so much conflicting but comple-
mentary approaches for supporting sustainable welfare. UBI focuses on the consumption side of the economy 
while UBS addresses the production side more directly, both of which would be relevant in any sustainable 
welfare system. Sustainable welfare outcomes of UBI and UBS would be shaped by the institutional contexts 
within which they operate, especially by the governance of markets, collective provisioning systems and 
decision-making at all levels. More attention needs to be paid to these institutional contexts when discussing 
potential sustainable welfare outcomes of UBI and UBS.   
1. Introduction 
The increasing urgency to tackle the climate crisis and social issues 
such as global inequality and conflict calls for rebuilding economic 
systems so that they stay within planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 
2009; Steffen et al., 2015) and satisfy human needs (Doyal and Gough, 
1991; Max-Neef et al., 1991). Rebuilding economics systems in this way 
would also require the establishment of welfare systems that support the 
dual goals of staying within planetary boundaries and needs satisfaction. 
A debate about such sustainable welfare systems is beginning to emerge, 
but more work is required to develop concrete proposals for ways in 
which sustainable welfare systems could be designed. This paper com-
pares two proposals for sustainable welfare policies that are sometimes 
presented as competing with each other – Universal Basic Income (UBI) 
and Universal Basic Services (UBS). However, I argue that both ap-
proaches could contribute to sustainable welfare and that they could 
complement each other, especially if their potential weaknesses are 
addressed by transforming the institutional contexts within which they 
operate. 
I define sustainable welfare in this article as welfare or social policy 
systems that support the satisfaction of human needs within planetary 
boundaries, following the proposal by Raworth (2017) to combine the 
planetary boundaries framework with theories of human needs. To 
compare UBI and UBS, I will apply four criteria that sustainable welfare 
systems would need to meet and that I derive in section 2 from the 
emerging sustainable welfare literature: 1) compatibility with planetary 
boundaries; 2) needs satisfaction; 3) fair distribution; and 4) democratic 
governance. 
While neither UBI nor UBS were primarily developed to deal with the 
ecological crisis, some authors have highlighted their potential benefits 
for addressing environmental issues or for supporting post-growth eco-
nomic systems (e.g. Coote and Percy, 2020: 47–51; Fitzpatrick, 2002). 
UBI refers to the payment of an unconditional income to everyone in 
society. Contemporary debates about UBI emerged in the 1970s while 
early ideas can be traced back to the 16th century (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght, 2017: ch. 3). The proposal for UBS was put forward in 
2017 (Institute for Global Prosperity, 2017). UBS refers to an uncondi-
tional provision of public services that address needs satisfaction to 
everyone in society. 
UBS proposals have portrayed UBS and UBI as incompatible, based 
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on the argument that they differ ideologically and would crowd each 
other out financially (e.g. Coote and Percy, 2020: 51–6) (but see Coote 
and Lawson (2021) for a more recent, conciliatory comment). In 
contrast, I will argue here that the two schemes could be compatible. A 
key difference between UBI and UBS is that UBI focuses on the con-
sumption side of the economy while UBS focuses on production or 
provision (where “provisioning systems” are defined as “set[s] of related 
elements that work together in the transformation of resources to satisfy 
a foreseen human need” Fanning et al., 2020). UBI provides people with 
cash, giving them the choice to consume what is available for monetary 
exchange. UBS start from the identification of basis needs, organise the 
collective provision of goods or services required to satisfy these needs, 
and provide people with free access to these goods and services. Each of 
these approaches has distinct strengths and weaknesses which this paper 
discusses, and any sustainable welfare system is likely to require a 
combination of these approaches. UBI and UBS can even be seen as 
interrelated because the design of one would influence the design of the 
other. For instance, if a basic amount of free electricity or water was 
provided to everyone for free (UBS), the required UBI amount to satisfy 
people's needs would be lower. And if people were provided with an 
unconditional income, they would have more capacity to participate in 
the collective provision of basic goods and services. 
Guided by insights from institutionalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Polanyi, 1997; Veblen, 1934), it is also important to emphasise that 
institutional contexts, especially the governance of markets and collec-
tive provisioning systems, would influence the performance of UBI and 
UBS, and that our experience of past and current institutional contexts 
shapes our conception of potential strengths and weaknesses of UBI and 
UBS.1 This implies that debates about UBI and UBS cannot be decoupled 
from debates about the institutional contexts within which they operate. 
The paper will address the role of institutions in shaping the sustainable 
welfare performance of UBI and UBS throughout. 
The debate about sustainable welfare, UBI and UBS is relevant across 
the world; however, these debates are shaped by specific economic and 
political situations in different world regions. This paper addresses the 
relationships between sustainable welfare, UBI and UBS in the context of 
the global north where advanced welfare states exist but are institu-
tionally coupled with unsustainable economic systems that exceed 
planetary boundaries, and where state capacity for the provision of 
services is relatively high. 
Section 2 defines the concept of sustainable welfare and explains the 
four criteria of sustainable welfare. Section 3 introduces UBI and UBS. 
Section 4 compares UBI and UBS using the four sustainable welfare 
criteria, and the last section discusses the complementarity of UBI and 
UBS, and ways in which their social and environmental outcomes would 
be shaped by a set of institutional contexts. 
2. Sustainable welfare 
Debates about sustainable welfare have only started to emerge 
recently and focus on re-defining welfare and wellbeing from an 
ecological perspective, often with an emphasis on human needs and 
planetary boundaries (Gough, 2017; Koch and Mont, 2016). Some of the 
earlier literature in this field started to raise questions about the con-
nections between social policy and the environment, but remained on 
the margins of mainstream social policy debates (e.g. Cahill, 2002; 
Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 2002; Huby, 1998). 
The current literature on sustainable welfare tends to support post- 
growth positions (Koch and Mont, 2016), where ‘post-growth’ can be 
understood as a generic term that covers a range of growth-critical ap-
proaches, including steady state economics (Daly and Farley, 2011), 
post-growth (Jackson, 2019), degrowth (Kallis et al., 2012; Schneider 
et al., 2010), a-growth (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012), doughnut 
economics (Raworth, 2017), and wellbeing economics (Trebeck and 
Williams, 2019). An important distinction needs to be drawn here be-
tween GDP growth and the growth of material throughput to the 
economy. The post-growth literature mainly focuses on material 
throughput as this is the main criterion for planetary boundaries. 
However, some of the post-growth literature also remains critical of GDP 
growth because currently available evidence suggests it is unlikely to be 
technologically feasible to stay within planetary boundaries while 
global GDP continues to grow. Even though there are examples of ab-
solute decoupling between GDP growth and environmental impacts in 
some rich countries, decoupling only occurred at very low rates of 
growth, and the rate of reduction of environmental impacts remains too 
slow to be compatible with planetary boundaries (Haberl et al., 2020). 
Criticism of GDP and material throughput growth also has a social 
dimension. Growth-based economies tend to be exploitative and in-
crease social inequalities. While not all growth-based systems are capi-
talist, all capitalist systems are by definition growth-based economies. 
Growth-critical positions hence tend to be critical of capitalism too 
(Hickel, 2021), and this includes most sustainable welfare positions. 
Growth criticism has several implications for welfare states because 
current western welfare systems and growth-based economics are 
closely coupled and mutually dependent on each other: the financing of 
welfare states currently depends on economic growth (Bailey, 2015) 
while welfare states contribute to economic growth and act as economic 
and social stabilisers (Büchs, 2021). 
Sustainable welfare systems would seek to overcome the mutual 
dependency between growth and welfare by making the financing of 
welfare independent from growth (e.g. by drawing on taxes that are less 
dependent on economic growth such as taxes on physical and financial 
capital, land, or inheritance) and by creating welfare systems that are 
not geared towards generating aggregate economic growth. While the 
question of how sustainable welfare systems, or UBI and UBS specif-
ically, could be financed, is beyond the scope of this paper, the extent to 
which UBI and UBS could support a post-growth economic context will 
be one of the elements of evaluation. 
In the remainder of this section, I will identify four criteria for sus-
tainable welfare systems that draw on the doughnut economics frame-
work (Raworth, 2017) and the literature on human needs (Doyal and 
Gough, 1991; Max-Neef et al., 1991). In later sections, I will apply these 
criteria to compare UBI and UBS. While there will be additional criteria 
that are relevant for sustainable welfare, I have selected these four 
because I think they represent four essential principles of sustainable 
welfare: 1) compatibility with planetary boundaries; 2) needs satisfac-
tion; 3) fair distribution; and 4) democratic governance. 
2.1. Compatibility with planetary boundaries 
This criterion demands that the outcomes of welfare institutions 
respect planetary boundaries. Rockström et al. (2009) and Steffen et al. 
(2015) have identified nine planetary boundaries, four of which have 
already been transgressed by human activity: climate change, biodi-
versity, nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, and land use change. Climate 
change and biodiversity have been identified as ‘core’ boundaries, 
which means that substantially transforming them could undermine the 
“safe operating space” within which humanity can thrive (Steffen et al., 
2015). Because of the close connection between the debate on 
1 For instance, in the context of the collapse of state communism and the 
‘New Washington Consensus’, critiques of public provision have become 
influential across the political spectrum during the 1980s and 1990s when 
support for UBI started to emerge. Many (centre) left parties in the global north 
repositioned themselves by adopting ‘third way’ policies which promoted a 
greater role for markets in service provision through ‘outsourcing’, ‘internal 
markets’ and privatisation. This is not to say that UBI proponents necessarily 
agree with these positions, in fact, UBI has often been presented as an alter-
native to ‘third way’ labour market activation policies. But what can be argued 
is that some conceptions of UBI have been shaped by a context of greater 
scepticism of state provision. 
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environmental impacts and economic growth, this criterion also evalu-
ates to what extent welfare institutions would aim at or have the po-
tential to contribute to GDP growth or growth of material throughput. 
2.2. Needs satisfaction 
This criterion demands that welfare institutions significantly 
contribute to the satisfaction of basic human needs. Several sustainable 
welfare scholars have argued that wellbeing and welfare should be 
conceptualised in terms of human needs rather than hedonic, utilitarian 
or subjective wellbeing approaches (e.g. Gough, 2017; Koch and Mont, 
2016). They maintain that needs approaches have greater scope to 
address planetary limits because needs, unlike wants, are satiable and 
non-substitutable (Gough, 2017). On an abstract level, human needs are 
objective and universal, but concrete needs satisfiers are culturally and 
historically specific. This article adopts Doyal and Gough's (1991) 
framework, in which the two main human needs are “health” and “au-
tonomy of agency” or freedom, both of which are required for the ulti-
mate goal of “minimally impaired social participation”. I interpret 
“minimally impaired social participation” as including participation in 
democratic decision making at various scales of the political system and 
within organisations. Ultimate needs of health and autonomy are 
underpinned by material and immaterial needs satisfiers, for instance 
food, water, housing, health care, education, safety and security, and 
significant relationships. An important additional dimension should be 
the provision of sufficient amounts of energy for heating, cooling, 
cooking, cleaning and mobility because access to energy is a condition 
for good health and social inclusion (e.g. Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 
2017). 
2.3. Fair distribution 
This criterion asks whether welfare institutions achieve a fair dis-
tribution of resources and opportunities, as well as of the costs and 
benefits of social and environmental policies. Fairness here means that 
the distribution of resources and opportunities should give everyone in 
society an equal chance to unimpaired social participation (Doyal and 
Gough, 1991) or equal capability to function (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 
1999). Fair distribution is an important criterion for sustainable welfare 
because it is a fundamental condition for social functioning and stability, 
especially in post-growth economic systems (Daly and Farley, 2011). 
Rising levels of inequality and hunger in many countries suggest that, 
without redistribution, economic growth no longer ‘trickles down’ to 
improve living standards and opportunities of disadvantaged people. 
Even if growth could improve welfare through ‘trickle down’ effects, this 
vehicle is not available in post-growth societies. Rather, fairer distri-
bution needs to be achieved through political decision-making. 
Furthermore, the criterion of fair distribution should not only apply to 
people within one country or locality, but also globally, and across 
generations. An assessment across countries and generations is outside 
of the scope of this paper, however. 
2.4. Democratic governance 
This criterion checks whether welfare institutions are being 
designed, adopted and changed through democratic and accountable 
processes at local, national and international scales. This dimension has 
been less prominent within the sustainable welfare literature so far. But I 
argue that it is an important element of an evaluative framework for 
sustainable welfare for three reasons. 
First, democratic rights and opportunities are a core dimension of 
human needs and should be part of the definition of sustainable welfare. 
For instance, Max-Neef et al. (1991) includes “participation” in his list of 
nine “axiological” needs. Doyal and Gough (1991) conceive of rights and 
opportunities for political participation as pre-conditions for needs 
satisfaction, but one can argue that these rights and opportunities should 
be listed directly among the needs satisfiers given that “minimally 
impaired participation in society” is defined as the ultimate need in 
society. Based on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
Raworth (2017) also includes “political voice” in her list of social 
foundations of the “doughnut”. 
Second, human needs are only ‘universal’ and ‘objective’ in an ab-
stract sense. Human needs approaches emphasise that needs satisfiers – 
the concrete ways in which needs can be satisfied within historically and 
culturally specific social contexts – can vary across time and space. To 
avoid a ‘paternalistic’, ‘top down’ identification of needs and needs 
satisfiers in welfare systems, citizens need to be given opportunities to 
participate in processes of defining needs and their satisfiers. 
Third, post-growth economic systems only have a chance to function 
well in the long term if they derive from democratic processes. The move 
to an economic system that stays within planetary boundaries requires 
fundamental changes that citizens approve of. This can only be achieved 
through truly democratic and participatory processes (Büchs and Koch, 
2019). 
3. Universal basic income and universal basic services 
3.1. Universal basic income 
Core to most definitions of UBI is the payment of an unconditional, 
regular income by the state to every resident in a country (Standing, 
2004; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). Unconditionality means that 
payments do not depend on levels of other income sources or wealth, 
willingness to work, or domestic living arrangements. Therefore, UBI is 
not a supplementary form of income support, minimum income guar-
antee, or a negative income tax, all of which would be withdrawn as 
soon as an individual receives income from other sources. The definition 
of UBI does not specify a set level of income, but supporters commonly 
argue that a UBI should be sufficiently generous to reduce poverty and 
increase people's ‘real freedoms’ (Raventós, 2007; Van Parijs and Van-
derborght, 2017: 10–11). Some proposals consider a ‘partial’ UBI at a 
lower level of income (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017: 165–9), and I 
will argue below that a partial UBI could complement UBS. 
Most proposals emphasise that UBI would need to be financed by 
replacing existing income support schemes and through progressive 
taxes. In this paper, I assume a progressive system of financing UBI 
which would result in a net redistribution from richer to poorer people. 
An analysis of the financial viability of UBI (and UBS) goes beyond the 
scope of the paper. Financial viability will critically depend on societies' 
willingness to redistribute and target resources towards UBI and UBS 
schemes which could become fundamental for establishing sustainable 
welfare systems. 
3.2. Universal basic services 
While discussions about public services and universal provision have 
a long history, the specific concept of UBS was only proposed recently in 
a report by the Institute of Global Prosperity (2017). Fundamental to the 
UBS proposal is that services that satisfy people's basic needs, including 
health and social care, education, and basic levels of housing, food, 
mobility and information, should be provided to everyone through 
public or collective institutions according to need, regardless of ability 
to pay and free at the point of use (Coote and Percy, 2020; Gough, 2019; 
Institute for Global Prosperity, 2017). Here, I will use a broad definition 
of UBS that includes universal basic infrastructures (such as roads and 
electricity grids) and universal vouchers (e.g. for home energy or public 
transport) (Bohnenberger, 2020; Foundational Economy Collective 
et al., 2018) because services, infrastructures and vouchers can be seen 
as complementary mechanisms for providing goods and services that 
satisfy needs. 
The universality of UBS mainly refers to the right to access services if 
need arises. The actual provision of UBS often requires some form of 
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needs assessment, for instance for health and social care. However, some 
goods and services could, in principle, also be allocated on an equal per 
capita basis such as internet access or even water and electricity. Equal 
per capita allocation removes needs testing and stigma, but bears the 
risk of over-providing for large households (which typically have lower 
per capita consumption due to economies of scale), and underproviding 
for people with additional needs, for instance due to old age or 
disability. This could be addressed by making the allocation tradable 
which maintains distributional outcomes of per capita schemes while 
achieving a more targeted allocation of the actual good or service in 
question. Which provision mechanism is more suitable for which type of 
need, and how levels of need would be determined, are highly complex 
questions that would need to be decided in democratic processes. 
4. UBI and UBS comparison 
4.1. Needs satisfaction 
In this section, I discuss the potential of UBI and UBS to meet the 
sustainable welfare criterion of needs satisfaction, first focusing on 
material needs and then on needs for autonomy and freedom. Needs for 
democratic voice and participation will be discussed in the section on 
democratic governance. 
4.1.1. Universal basic income 
UBI would seek to address people's needs by providing a basic in-
come to everyone, either at a level that is sufficient for satisfying needs, 
or lower levels that contribute to needs satisfaction. One of the advan-
tages of universal, unconditional provision of a UBI is that it would 
remove means- and needs-testing. Means- and needs-testing can limit 
take-up of benefits among disadvantaged people due to stigma and 
bureaucratic hassle, a problem that universal provision would address. 
A UBI could also contribute to needs satisfaction by freeing up time 
for people to engage in activities they value. The ability to pursue 
meaningful activities is often regarded as a human need in itself (Max- 
Neef et al., 1991), but many of these activities can also contribute to the 
needs satisfaction of others, for instance through care work, volunteer-
ing, or political engagement. Whether people can be trusted to spend 
their time in socially useful ways has been a point of controversy. In 
response to such concerns, some proposals combine a basic income with 
forms of conditionality, such as the one by Atkinson (1996). However, 
these versions are not included in the definition of UBI applied in this 
paper. 
Some authors have raised concerns about UBI's ability to satisfy 
needs. UBI would provide cash so that people can satisfy their needs by 
consuming goods and services that are available for purchase. UBI critics 
often assume that goods and services would be provided through mar-
kets and raise the concern that if market failures occur, needs satisfac-
tion through UBI could be compromised. Markets may not provide 
certain goods or services, or only at inadequate levels of quality or 
affordability (Coote and Percy, 2020: 51–5). Another concern is that a 
UBI could crowd out already existing public service provision, e.g. for 
health care or education (ibid.: 52). Since UBI focuses on the con-
sumption side of the economy and does not specify whether goods and 
services should be provided by the market or collectively, it is sometimes 
perceived to favour market provision over collective provision. This 
perception may also have been bolstered through right-wing UBI pro-
ponents who have advocated the replacement of welfare state in-
stitutions with the private provision of health and social care, or 
education (Murray, 2008). 
In addition, UBI has been regarded as a potentially powerful vehicle 
to support people's needs for freedom and autonomy. First, a UBI would 
make people less dependent on paid employment and thus support their 
‘de-commodification’. Greater autonomy in the labour market would 
strengthen employees' position vis-a-vis capital owners (Offe, 2008; 
Wright, 2006). Second, a UBI would reduce people's financial 
dependency on partners or other close relations, enabling them to leave 
abusive or unsupportive relationships (still mainly relevant to women). 
A basic income would therefore give everyone in society the capacity to 
‘be and do what they have reason to value’ (Sen, 1999), and to enhance 
people's ‘freedom to’ make use of opportunities (rather than just reduce 
‘freedom from’ poverty, oppression, etc.) (Van Parijs, 1995). 
4.1.2. Universal basic services 
The proposal for UBS focuses on how people's basic needs can be met 
most reliably and fairly. Proponents argue that a universal and free, 
public or collective provision of basic services which directly address 
people's needs would be more efficient and effective than a market- 
based approach (Coote and Percy, 2020: 39–43). UBS advocates argue 
that markets can be unreliable in meeting people's needs, as demon-
strated by inflated housing markets or high prices for public transport, 
especially in systems with private monopolies and complex pricing 
structures that disadvantage consumers (Bowman et al., 2014; Foun-
dational Economy Collective et al., 2018). They hence argue that public 
provision can be more effective here: “Providing a single mother with a 
cash payment to fend for herself in an inflated housing market is not as 
effective as providing quality public housing” (Pavanelli, 2019). 
The arguments put forward by UBS proponents rest on specific as-
sumptions: that UBI inherently favours market provision; that govern-
ments are not able or willing to regulate markets; and that governments 
are willing and able to provide high quality goods and services that 
satisfy basic needs. However, there is no reason why UBI could not be 
combined with collective provision or market regulation; and public or 
collective provision does not automatically guarantee that this provision 
is adequate for satisfying needs. 
In addition to addressing needs satisfacton directly, UBS could 
contribute to needs satisfaction indirectly by increasing people's ability 
to engage in activities that they value. UBS would provide an in-kind, 
“virtual income” or “social wage” because individuals would no longer 
need to pay for these services from their income (Coote and Percy, 2020; 
Gough, 2019). Similar to UBI, this would make people less dependent on 
the labour market, increase their bargaining power in the workplace, 
and free them up to pursue activities that they value and that can 
address needs of others too, such as care and voluntary work. The pro-
vision of UBS would also create higher demand for workers in basic 
services sectors, including health and social care, education, housing, 
food production, energy, public transport and communication services. 
Many jobs in some of these sectors require direct personal interaction 
and are more difficult to rationalise. Since these jobs would be located in 
the public sphere, they would be sheltered from pressures of interna-
tional competition (Coote and Percy, 2020: 48; Foundational Economy 
Collective et al., 2018: 3). This is a benefit in a context with low or no 
economic growth as it provides more stable job opportunities. 
Critics of UBS see its weakness in its more prescriptive approach 
(Coote et al., 2019: 18) and its potential to bolster powerful state bu-
reaucracies that are insufficiently responsive to people's needs. Where 
UBI would give people the choice about how they want to spend the 
money they receive, UBS would make assumptions about ways in which 
people's needs are best satisfied. Liberals view such assumptions as 
paternalistic. Those who defend the idea of universal basic needs and 
UBS counter that ensuring the satisfaction of basic needs creates the 
material conditions for people to be autonomous and make use of their 
positive freedoms. Much would depend on how democratic and partic-
ipatory the political and administrative processes are through which 
needs and needs satisfiers are defined (see section 4.4). 
4.2. Planetary boundaries 
4.2.1. Universal basic income 
Various scholars have promoted UBI from an ecological perspective 
(e.g. Birnbaum, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2002; Lawhon and McCreary, 2020; 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). Some argue that a UBI could aid 
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transitions to an environmentally beneficial post-growth economy as it 
would support people's livelihoods in the context of low or no economic 
growth. 
Commentators remain divided on the question of whether a UBI 
would reduce environmental impacts. To assess this, one needs to 
consider the impacts of a UBI on the supply of labour and consumption 
(growth of material throughput). If UBI reduces labour supply and 
consumption, resource use and related environmental impacts would 
fall, but the opposite would be the case if labour supply and consump-
tion increase. 
Many supporters argue that a UBI has the potential to reduce the 
supply of labour and hence the growth of material throughput because it 
offers people an alternative source of income and increases their bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis employers (Lawhon and McCreary, 2020; Offe, 
1992; Wright, 2004). Spending and associated environmental impacts 
could also decline because people now have more time to engage in 
activities that serve their ‘real’ needs which they previously attempted 
to address through consumption. Greater equality that results from the 
redistributive effects of UBI might also reduce ‘conspicuous consump-
tion’ (Veblen, 1934) through which people seek to boost their social 
status (Boulanger, 2009). 
These views are countered by concerns that a UBI could increase 
material throughput growth if it increases economic efficiency. Eco-
nomic efficiency could increase if UBI reduces administrative burdens as 
other welfare benefits are abolished (Birnbaum, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 
2002). How UBI would affect employment levels and hence consump-
tion is also unclear. UBI is sometimes promoted with the argument that 
it could increase the supply of labour among low income groups. This 
could happen because the universal provision of UBI removes eligibility 
criteria for benefits common in many current welfare regimes, and 
hence reduces disincentives for labour market participation that 
currently exist for benefit recipients (Raventós, 2007: 22). Several UBI 
experiments found supporting evidence for increasing labour market 
participation (Forget, 2011; Kela, 2020). In contrast, it has been argued, 
a UBI might decrease labour supply of better situated people because it 
provides a secure, alternative source of income and thus the opportunity 
to trade work with leisure or other ‘purposeful’ activities (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght, 2017). An analysis of a UBI experiment that covered a 
whole town in Canada in the 1970s found an aggregate decrease of la-
bour market participation and an increase in wages (Calnitsky, 2018). 
But things are complicated by the fact that higher income groups would 
experience a net loss of income from a UBI that is financed through 
progressive taxation. If higher income groups want to maintain their 
lifestyles, they may still increase supply of labour. 
Impacts of a UBI on consumption also remain unclear. Even if a 
progressively financed UBI would not result in a net, economy-wide 
increase in income and only redistributes from richer to poorer peo-
ple, it could lead to an increase in consumption and associated emissions 
as shown in recent modelling of a hypothetical reduction of global 
inequality (Oswald et al., 2021). This is because average spending by 
lower income groups is more carbon intensive per monetary unit than 
that of higher income groups since poorer people spend a higher pro-
portion of their income on carbon intensive goods and services such as 
home energy or motor fuels (Büchs et al., 2014). However, the studies 
cited here do not take the impact of savings and investments into ac-
count. Rich people are far more likely than poorer people to invest their 
money for financial gain. Such investments rely on for-profit business 
models and growth-oriented economic systems which tend to be related 
to increased environmental impacts. If the environmental impacts of 
investments are taken into account, a redistribution from richer to 
poorer people could therefore have overall beneficial environmental 
impacts. 
Furthermore, a UBI on its own would not change the way in which 
goods are produced or services provided, and it would not dis/incenti-
vise what people could spend the additional income on. If there are few 
options for environmentally friendly consumption, or if people choose to 
spend their income on high-impact products, a UBI would have little 
capacity to reduce environmental impacts (Andersson, 2009; Boulanger, 
2009; MacNeill and Vibert, 2019). 
Some scholars have proposed UBI could be coupled with environ-
mental policies, for instance by financing it through taxes on natural 
resources or pollution (Andersson, 2009; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 
2017: 149–152). While at first sight this appears to be a win-win sce-
nario, it has problems. For instance, financing a UBI through taxes on 
pollution would undermine its financial basis in the long run if these 
taxes successfully reduce environmental impacts (Calder, 2009). In 
addition, environmental taxes are often highly regressive because they 
burden low income households more in relative terms (Büchs et al., 
2014). A UBI would need to counteract these regressive effects, which 
could reduce its redistributive capacity. 
4.2.2. Universal basic services 
To compare possible macroeconomic effects of UBS such as labour 
supply and consumption (material throughput) to UBI, one first needs to 
ask how the two compare distributionally. Similar to UBI, if UBS were 
financed through progressive taxes, we would see a redistribution from 
rich to poor because the provision of services is worth more to poorer 
than to richer people in relative terms (Gough, 2019; Verbist et al., 
2012). Impacts on the supply of labour, consumption and related envi-
ronmental impacts would hence be similar to UBI. 
However, UBS differ from UBI in that provision could be explicitly 
designed in an environmentally friendly way. For instance, renewably 
generated electricity could be prioritised in the provision of basic 
amounts of free ‘green’ electricity; social housing could be built to net 
zero emission standards, etc. Supporters therefore argue UBS could be 
more effective than UBI in reducing environmental impacts since the 
latter would rely on the provision through (often insufficiently regu-
lated) markets. However, whether governments would provide UBS in 
an environmentally friendly way largely depends on political decision- 
making and the way in which service provision is managed; it would 
not be an inherent feature of UBS; and as discussed above, UBI is not 
inherently reliant on (unregulated) market provision. 
It should be noted that UBS could lead to a decrease in GDP because 
distributing certain basic goods and services for free to the population 
would not lead to monetary transactions and hence not appear in GDP 
accounting. As discussed above, the environmental impact of such a shift 
would depend on the ways in which provision is organised. But political 
contexts which do not prioritise GDP growth might be required to 
facilitate a shift to UBS. 
Another factor to consider which relates to both UBI and UBS is that 
universal provision of income or services would likely increase the 
consumption of energy in the home, for travel and other consumption of 
people who were previously under-consuming due to fuel, transport and 
general poverty. Ending all forms of poverty and limitations of needs 
satisfaction would need to be at the core of sustainable welfare. How-
ever, to prevent an aggregate increase in energy and material con-
sumption, this would need to be counter-acted with reductions in 
consumption at the top of the distribution. 
4.3. Fair distribution 
4.3.1. Universal basic income 
Creating a fairer distribution of both material conditions and op-
portunities is one of the main aims of UBI. Even though every eligible 
person would receive the same income, this would be worth more to low 
income than high income households relative to their income. In addi-
tion, it is often assumed that a UBI would be financed through pro-
gressive taxes, for instance on income and wealth (but note that there 
are some proposals such as those summarised by Van Parijs & Vander-
borght (2017: 154-8) to finance a UBI with sales taxes (value added tax) 
which tend to be regressive). 
Estimating overall distributive outcomes would need to take into 
M. Büchs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Ecological Economics 189 (2021) 107152
6
account the effect of abolishing other cash benefits and the impact of UBI 
on real wages. Most proposals assume that a UBI would replace existing 
minimum income schemes. In relative terms, the removal of these 
schemes would reduce incomes at the bottom and middle of the distri-
bution more than top incomes. For overall distributive effects of UBI to 
remain progressive, financing of the UBI would need to correct for this 
by putting higher burdens on rich households. Modelling by the OECD 
(2017) has shown that while the richest income groups would tend to be 
the greatest net losers from a UBI, there are some scenarios in which low 
to middle income groups would be the greatest net losers due to the 
removal of existing cash benefits. 
Furthermore, distributional outcomes of a UBI would depend on ef-
fects on real wages. In response to a UBI, employers might decrease 
wages (Zamora, 2017) because they know that people's living costs are 
now partly covered by the basic income. In addition, producers might 
increase prices in response to higher taxes on capital or profits, thus 
passing costs on to consumers and reducing real incomes. Impacts on 
wages might differ by sector. For instance, wages of unpopular, low-pay 
jobs may increase if workers can reduce their labour supply for such jobs 
due to the greater financial security they would have with the UBI 
(Calnitsky, 2018). Conversely, wages in higher paid sectors might fall, 
for instance if a UBI would lead to higher labour supply here due to the 
impacts of progressive income taxation. Such shifts in wages may have 
additional redistributive effects. 
Feminist supporters of UBI have argued that a UBI could contribute 
to greater gender equality because it could support women's autonomy 
by reducing dependency on male breadwinners and because it would 
compensate women for currently unpaid care work (Cox, 2019). At the 
same time, a UBI could remove career pressure on men and thus enable 
them to make a greater contribution to care and household 
responsibilities. 
4.3.2. Universal basic services 
In a UBS system, every person would be entitled to be provided with 
basic goods and services according to need and free at the point of use. 
UBS provide an in-kind income. While some services such as housing are 
targeted at low income groups, richer groups tend to benefit more from 
services such as tertiary education (Verbist et al., 2012). But on average, 
the value of existing in-kind public service provision has shown to be 
very evenly distributed across income groups in OECD countries (ibid: 
35). Since the value of service provision constitutes a higher proportion 
of income for low income groups compared to high income groups 
(ibid.), the distributional effects of UBS would be similar to UBI. 
Tradeable per capita provision might be possible for certain services 
such as water, electricity and internet provision, and this would have 
equivalent distributional effects for the same amount of UBI. 
Supporters argue that UBS would make the distribution of the ca-
pacity for needs satisfaction fairer compared to existing cash benefit 
systems which, in many countries, are not sufficiently effective in 
satisfying needs, lifting people out of poverty and reducing inequality 
(Institute for Global Prosperity, 2017: 18–9). 
These redistributive effects of UBS could have similar impacts on real 
wages compared to UBI. If prices increase as producers pass on addi-
tional taxation to consumers, people would be shielded from such price 
increases for the portion of basic goods and services provided through 
UBS. Furthermore, UBI arguments about greater gender equality can be 
extended to UBS because the in-kind income would strengthen women's 
autonomy, compensate for care work, and support a more even distri-
bution of care work and household tasks between men and women. 
4.4. Democratic governance 
4.4.1. Universal basic income 
UBI could improve democracy as it would give people greater 
freedom over their use of time and hence greater capacity to participate 
in democratic processes (Casassas, 2016; Raventós, 2007). However, 
this only holds if supply of labour really decreases under UBI as its 
supporters claim. Furthermore, whether or not greater availability of 
time would result in increased participation and more democratic 
policy-making would depend on the design of democratic institutions. In 
more general terms, several UBI trials have shown that UBI can change 
people's self-perceptions and relationships in ways that could be bene-
ficial for political participation and support for green policies. In several 
trials, the receipt of UBI was associated with lower stress and anxiety 
levels (Lawhon and McCreary, 2020), perhaps because the payment 
gave people a greater sense of social security. Potentially, UBI could thus 
make people feel more connected to the state and reduce perceptions of 
individual risk, which could increase political support for green policies 
(ibid.). 
However, critics have argued that UBI would do little to enhance 
workplace democracy. While it may strengthen the position of workers 
vis-à-vis capital owners, it would not fundamentally change the rela-
tionship between them (Gourevitch, 2016). Additional measures would 
be required to increase workplace democracy. 
4.4.2. Universal basic services 
Since UBS would provide a ‘virtual income’ that could free up peo-
ple's time from paid employment, UBS has a similar potential compared 
to UBI to enhance people's capacity for democratic participation 
(dependent on labour market effects). Similar to UBI, UBS could increase 
people's sense of social security, their perceived relationship to the state 
and to each other, with the potential to generate a more supportive 
context for radical green policies. 
However, one likely objection against UBS is that the definition of 
needs and needs satisfiers can be paternalistic, and that the provision of 
UBS would require large state bureaucracies which might be managed 
top-down without much user participation. There are several ways in 
which these concerns can be addressed. First, several authors have 
emphasised the importance of deliberative democratic processes to 
involve citizens in the definition of needs and needs satisfiers in their 
respective contexts (taking into account planetary boundaries and needs 
of future generations and of other communities) (e.g. Büchs and Koch, 
2019; Gough, 2017). Experiments with citizen juries that have emerged 
in response to the climate emergency are encouraging in that respect. 
Debates about basic needs satisfaction could be modelled on, and 
potentially even linked to such processes, to combine the debate about 
needs with debates about how needs satisfaction can be achieved within 
planetary boundaries. Second, UBS supporters stress that they envisage 
a re-design of public service provision that is user-led, co-produced and 
democratically accountable, and hence responsive to people's and 
communities' needs (Coote et al., 2019; Coote and Percy, 2020). Service 
delivery could be organised in collaboration with organisations that are 
more democratically and cooperatively run than traditional state 
administrations. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The comparison between UBI and UBS suggests that each of them 
would have the capacity to support sustainable welfare. At the same 
time, specific opportunities and risks can be identified in relation to each 
of these proposals. It is important, however, not to understand these 
opportunities and risks as inherent features of UBI and UBS but rather as 
co-shaped by institutional contexts that influence the ways in which UBI 
and UBS operate and the outcomes they generate. It follows that po-
tential risks of UBI and UBS could be addressed through the design of 
institutional contexts such as the governance of markets, states, and 
decision-making; as well as policies that influence macro-economic and 
distributional effects of UBI and UBS. In this section, I discuss a set of 
institutions and factors that would influence the potential of UBI and 
UBS to support sustainable welfare (summarised in Fig. 1), and sum-
marise the ways in which UBI and UBS can contribute to sustainable 
welfare. 
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The main argument that I want to put forward based on the com-
parison of UBI and UBS is that they can be regarded as complementary 
modes of provisioning that can promote sustainable welfare if institu-
tional contexts address their respective risks. In this scenario, a partial 
UBI at a lower level of income that contributes to needs satisfaction (Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017: 165–9) would be sufficient and benefi-
cial because it could avoid financial competition between the two ap-
proaches. How exactly UBI and UBS could be combined is an open 
question that would require further work and public debate. 
An important difference between UBI and UBS is that UBI would 
focus on the consumption side of the economy while UBS more directly 
address production or provisioning. A UBI would be an income that 
everyone can choose to spend as they wish on goods and services that are 
available for monetary exchange, whether they are provided by pri-
vately or collectively owned and managed institutions. UBS are by 
definition collectively provided and access is free of charge at the point 
of use. It is plausible that sustainable welfare systems would require a 
mix of these two forms of support. For instance, in areas where prefer-
ences or personal needs matter more, as for example in relation to food 
or clothing, at least a certain extent of choice over purchasing decisions 
is important. 
Collective provision can be a useful tool for tackling common market 
failures because it pools risks and resources. Collective provision is 
hence particularly well suited in areas such as health and social care or 
education, or the provision of relatively uniform goods and services such 
as water, home energy, public transport, and internet services (including 
the physical infrastructures that support them). 
How UBI and UBS would perform in relation to sustainable welfare 
criteria would be shaped by institutional contexts. The first set of in-
stitutions in Fig. 1 relates to the governance of provisioning, i.e. market 
regulation and the governance of collective provision. The governance 
of provisioning impacts on environmental and social standards applied 
in the provisioning process, and the extent to which provisioning is 
responsive to people's needs. UBS advocates often portrait UBI as an 
approach that favours market provision, but UBI does not inherently rely 
on a specific mode of provisioning, just on provisioning for monetary 
exchange. However, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that the 
discussion about UBI cannot be decoupled from a discussion about the 
provisioning systems within which it would operate: a UBI could have 
vastly different outcomes depending on whether goods and services are 
provided through highly unregulated markets or through a more coor-
dinated system which features market regulation and collective provi-
sioning. The governance of markets would therefore influence 
sustainable welfare outcomes. Market regulation would not only be 
relevant for UBI but also for UBS because even public or collective in-
stitutions may have to purchase goods and services on the market to 
organise the provision of basic services to people in need (e.g. products 
for social housing developments, buses for public transport schemes, 
etc.). Better market regulation could address at least some types of 
market failures. For instance, if a right to housing was enshrined in law 
and if there were limits on the rents that landlords can charge, a UBI 
could contribute to the satisfaction of housing needs. Environmental and 
social standards could also be set for the provision of energy, public 
transport, food and other consumer items. International and national 
annual carbon budgets that contract over time could provide a frame-
work that would limit the growth of material throughput and shape 
production and consumption. 
Equally important is the governance of collective provision, both for 
UBS which are by definition collectively provided, as well as for UBI if 
collective provisioning is part of its institutional context. UBS advocates 
argue that collective provision could address needs satisfaction more 
directly and effectively, and achieve a reduction of environmental 
Fig. 1. Institutions and factors that would shape the sustainable welfare potential of UBI and UBS.  
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impacts by designing provision in an environmentally friendly way. 
However, whether this potential can be realised depends crucially on the 
ways in which collective provision is organised. Collective provision 
would need to be governed such that it prioritises environmental per-
formance and needs satisfaction which could be promoted by making 
provision responsive to user needs, and through state-citizen co-design, 
public accountability, and rigorous environmental assessment. 
Both UBI and UBS thus have the potential to contribute to sustainable 
welfare outcomes. By providing cash or in-kind income, both UBI and 
UBS have the capacity to make people less dependent on paid employ-
ment, enhancing people's positive freedoms and their ability to engage 
in purposeful activities. This can contribute to people's own wellbeing, 
but also to needs satisfaction and environmental protection in society 
more widely. Both UBI and UBS could also support the goal of staying 
within planetary boundaries if a fall in aggregate employment equates to 
a fall in consumption and associated environmental impacts. Further-
more, both approaches are thought to have progressive distributional 
effects: if they are financed progressively, poorer people would receive a 
net gain from these schemes while richer people would experience a net 
loss of (cash or in-kind) income. In addition, distributional effects would 
be influenced by ways in which increases and decreases in labour market 
participation that result from UBI and UBS are distributed across 
different social groups, as well by the impact of UBI and UBS on wages, 
salaries and prices. 
These considerations show that these environmental and distribu-
tional outcomes would depend on the ways in which UBI and UBS 
interact with a range of economic policies (e.g. labour market, mone-
tary, taxation policies) and the macroeconomic effects that arise from 
this interaction. Very fundamentally, the quality of the institutions that 
would influence the sustainable welfare performance of UBI and UBS 
would depend on the design of collective decision making at all levels of 
policy-making and within organisations. The design of decision-making 
is crucial for the quality of democracy, as well as for the accountability 
and effectiveness of decision-making. 
In conclusion, both UBI and UBS have the potential to contribute to 
sustainable welfare. There would be a place for both UBI and UBS in 
sustainable welfare systems because both have particular strengths that 
can be combined. The sustainable welfare performance of both UBI and 
UBS is likely to be shaped by institutional contexts within which they 
operate. Discussions about UBI and UBS hence need to address these 
institutional contexts more directly, including the governance of mar-
kets and collective provisioning, as well as decision-making at all levels. 
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